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PANEL V
EQUALITY VERSUS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING
ILENE H. NAGEL-STEPHEN BREYER-TERENCE
MACCARTHY
INTRODUCTION BY

THE

HONORABLE FRANK H.

EASTERBROOK*

Ever since the beginning of the republic, both state and federal judges have
had wide discretion in imposing sentences. They have had discretion in the

sources of information they used in imposing sentences within a range, based
on their own mix of considerations of desert, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation, and in deciding how to weigh each of these factors. For example, some judges believe that violent offenses are more serious than property

offenses, and others hate stealth offenses more than violent offenses. In addition to the discretion implicit in the range for each statute, judges have had
the discretion to choose between consecutive and concurrent sentences.
The result is a great deal of variation: judge-to-judge, urban versus rural,
and region-to-region. In a northern city such as Chicago, a crime involving a
small transaction of drugs might lead to an award of probation. In a rural
southern city, on the other hand, the identical crime might lead to a twentyyear sentence.. A national consensus developed that this variation is inappropriate.

In 1984, without opposition, Congress passed a determinate sentencing law.
Several states have passed parallel laws. The Sentencing Guidelines became effective for crimes committed after November 1, 1987. The package has several
components: more elaborate fact-finding; statements of reasons; appellate review; and ranges based on the seriousness of the main offense with aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Proponents of this package hoped that it
would end judge-to-judge and region-to-region disparities, promote candor in
sentencing, and provide judges with relative values in sentences.
It is appropriate to ask: What are the Sentencing Guidelines and will they
work? The panel today will address these questions. Some people believe that
even though the system is designed to reduce discretion, it is very difficult to
implement in practice. Although there was a national consensus in 1984 that
reducing discretion is a great idea, this consensus has evaporated.
This evaporation reflects a traditional pattern in the regulation of conduct
by the government that has carried over to the regulation of sentences. Some
* United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago.
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people would treat determinate sentencing as no different in principle from
price control-it imposes a single price for a single activity. These people
would predict the development of the standard responses to price control:
black markets and queues.
The Guidelines' parallel to the black market is charging discretion. The
prosecutor and the defendant may take the crime off the books by not charging the real offense, by charging some subset of the offense, or by withholding from the judge the information necessary to impose the sentence. Forms
of misbehavior also exist. For example, if the Guidelines require a sentence
that is too high for the judge's druthers, a much higher rate of acquittal or
conviction on lesser included offenses or, to put it mildly, winking at the facts
when the time comes to make the decision might occur.
The authors of the Guidelines need to control these responses to the Guidelines. The possibility of the creation of a substantial fact-finding apparatus,
and, because of the various forms of evasion, no greater uniformity in real
sentences, cause concern. The program for this afternoon's panel is a description of what it is that is being done and some questions about whether it will
work in practice.
Here to discuss these questions are two members of the Sentencing Commission and one member of the criminal bar: Ilene Nagel, Stephen Breyer and
Terence MacCarthy.

1989]

SYMPOSIUM: EQUALITY VERSUS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING

PRESENTATION

By

COMMISSIONER ILENE

H.

1815

NAGEL*

For ten years, the United States Congress wrestled with the tripartite problems of federal sentencing: unwarranted disparity and its sometime corollary
discrimination, dishonesty, and excessive leniency.'
Disparity left us with cohorts of defenders who, despite conviction for the

same offense and similar criminal histories, served, for example, a range of
time in prison spread across fifteen years for bank robbery, or nineteen years
for heroin distribution, with some serving no time at all.2 Moreover, unfettered judicial discretion provided a shield for discrimination: some district
court judges systematically treated blacks and hispanics more harshly, while
others used the court to promote a system of alleged justice, where minorities
were given light sentences as an accommodation to past societal wrongs, the
latter pattern without regard for the dire consequences this practice holds for
minority and other victims.'
Female codefendants routinely received lesser sanctions in accordance with
paternalistic assumptions; 4 this, in spite of the increase in the absolute number
of crimes committed by women, and with almost total disregard for the inequities caused by such a practice.
While many judges gave excessively light sentences for economic crimes,
thereby compromising deterrence, and precluding the potential for sentences to
promote crime control, others treated white collar offenders as deserving of
extremely harsh sentences, not only for the crimes they had committed, but
for the alleged sin of having led or been born to a more privileged life. Race,
sex, and social class of the offender,' rather than being neutral and irrelevant
*

United States Sentencing Commission. The following remarks were prepared by the author.

1. The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (Brown Commission) was
created in 1966 upon the recommendation of President Johnson. The twelve member commission
published its Final Report in 1971. Hearings on this Final Report began during the 92nd Congress. The first specific legislative proposals on federal sentencing were introduced in 1973. In
1976 during the 94th Congress, Senator Kennedy introduced the first bill calling for sentencing
guidelines. Similar bills were introduced and debated during the 95th, 96th and 97th Congresses.
During the 98th Congress as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, the Sentencing Reform Act was passed. Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, tit. 11, ch. I1, secs. 211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-2040 (1984) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 3551-3559, 3571-3574 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp.
V l987). For the legislative history of the Sentencing Act, see 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN.
NEWS 3182, 3220.
2. Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 Before the Subcomm. of Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 661, 685
(1987) (statement of Ilene H. Nagel, Commissioner of United States Sentencing Commission).
3. Id.
4. 1. NAGEL & J. HAGAN, GENDER AND CIME: OFFENSE PATTERNS AND CRIMINAL COURT
SANCTIONS IN CRDME AND JUSTICE: AN

ANNUAL

REVIEW Oi

RESEARCH

91-144

(Tonry &

Morris,

eds. 1983).
5. See, e.g., Bullock, Significance of the Racial Factor in the Length of Prison Sentences, 52
J. CRIM. L. & CRMINOLOGY 411 (1961); Parisi, Are Females Treated Differently?, in JuDGE, LAWYER, VICTIM, THnEF 205 (Rafter & Sanko, eds. 1982).
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to sentence determinations, exacerbated or mitigated the levels of punishment,
in no consistent way, and for no justifiable reasons.
In addition to unwarranted disparity, sentence pronouncements were misleading; a twelve year term of imprisonment meant four years in most instances, but only the victim, his family, and the public were duped. Because
of this systemic sham, each player in the criminal justice system secondguessed the next, with6 no one recommending a sentence thought to be appropriate to the offense.
Finally, despite conviction for serious felonies, under past federal sentencing
practices, over 40 percent of the federal offender population was sentenced to
serve zero time. For tax violations, where the government and the taxpaying
public are the victims, fifty-seven percent of those convicted were sentenced to
zero time, and for property offenses, the percentage reaches sixty percent. 7 Is
it no wonder that the absolute rate of crimes committed continues to soar?
Under past sentencing practice, for many offenses, there is little doubt that
crime pays.
The question of equality versus discretion lies at the heart of each of these
problems, and at the heart of the controversial proposed remedies.'
Disparity for persons convicted of like crimes with similar criminal histories
can easily be remedied by prescribing the same sentence for each. Attempts to
define what are like crimes and what are similar criminal histories, however,
immediately reveals the hidden complexity of this seemingly simple solution. 9
According to whose values do we define "likeness of crime?" By what criteria
does one equate a robbery with an embezzlement? What is the measure of
"similar" criminal history? Are five arrests with one conviction similar to one
conviction? Are three sentences of two years probation for past crimes similar
to one sentence of two years imprisonment? Even assuming consensus could
be reached as to what are like offenses, and what are similar criminal histories, is the same sentence for those similarly classified a step towards equality?
Could not one argue, as is often heard in court, that conviction for some is
tantamount to prison for others?
On the strength of these arguments and derivatives therefrom, many judges
and most defense attorneys argue for individualized sentences with a maximum
of judicial discretion.
The United States Congress, in crafting the enabling legislation for the
United States Sentencing Commission, opted not to choose between: A) a sys6. See, e.g., Kennedy, Criminal Sentencing: A Game of Chance, 60 Jun. 208 (1976); S. REP.
No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 46-49 (1983).
7. See United States Sentencing Commission, Research Data Compiled During Examination of
over 10,000 Federal Sentences (unpublished) (available at United States Sentencing Commission)

(discussing actual violations for tax violations).
8. See Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975 (1978) (discussing remedies).
9. See Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1988); Nagel, The Structure of Judicial Discretion Under the
- (1990).
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIBJOLOOY
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tern calling for the continuation of unfettered discretion; and B) one with excessive rigidity, giving only the appearance of equality; but, rather, to
compromise. The vehicle was to be mandatory sentencing guidelines, binding
on the court, but from which the court could depart for unusual, atypical,
extraordinary cases.' 0
In 1985, President Reagan appointed, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, three federal judges, three former law professors, and one former
prison warden to serve two, four, or six-year terms on a bipartisan, full-time
commission, whose primary task it was to promulgate sentencing guidelines for
all federal offenses.
The enabling legislation specified four purposes: just punishment for the offense; deterrence; incapacitation; and effective correctional treatment. All four
statutory objectives were to be maximized by the Guidelines. No single purpose was to predominate."
After a year's experimentation in drafting and testing of three different approaches to sentencing guidelines, each incorporating varying formats, structures, degrees of judicial discretion, principles, and theoretical bases, six
Commissioners forged a coalition and agreed to the following principles of
drafting.
First: Similar offense categories defined by varying statutes would be
grouped together under a single generic heading. For example, all of the fraud
statutes were grouped together under the generic heading of "fraud." 12
Second: The base sentence for each offense category would be determined as
a result of the Commission's discussion, a process that would be anchored,
but not bound by, an examination of the average time served in past years for
offenders convicted of that same offense and the percentage given a non-incarceration sentence.
Third: For articulated policy reasons, the Commission would adjust base
sentences for some offense categories up or down, relative to past practice.
For example, for the sake of deterrence, sentences for tax evasion might be
raised. For the sake of public protection, sentences for violent offenders would
be lengthened.
Fourth: Base sentences for each offense category would be modified by a
set of what we called "specific offense characteristics." The standard for the
Commission's decision for inclusion as a specific offense characteristic would
be either: A) that empirical analyses of past sentencing practice showed that
10. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 50-60 (1983). "The sentencing guidelines
system will not remove all the judges' sentencing discretion. Instead, it will guide the judge in
making his decision ...." Id. at 51.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. V 1987); S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 76-79
(1983).
12. See, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual 2.67. The heading
"fraud" groups together the following crimes: 7 U.S.C. §§ 6, 6(b), 6(c), 6(h), 6(o), 13, 23 (1982
& Supp. V 1987); 15 U.S.C. §§ 50, 77(e), 77(q), 77(x), 78(d), 78(j), 78(ff), 80(b)(6), 1644; 18
U.S.C. §§ 285-91, 65(g), 1001-08, 1010-14, 1016-22, 1025-26, 1028-29, 1341-44 (1982 & Supp. V
1987).
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judges routinely distinguished one offender convicted of the base offense from
another, on the basis of such a characteristic; for example, the amount of or
type of drugs in drug offenses, the amount of monetary loss, or degree of
planning in a fraud, the degree of physical injury in a robbery, the possession
of a firearm in a burglary; or B) the relevant statute makes such a distinction,
such as the use of a weapon in a bank robbery, trafficking in controlled
substances involving an individual fourteen years of age or less, or distributing
specific controlled substances within one thousand feet of a schoolyard; or C)
some special compelling reason was articulated to justify including the specific
offense characteristic, for example, the degree of planning had been included
for fraud; thus, it was included for theft, since frauds and thefts involve similar conduct.
Fifth: Convictions for conspiracies and attempts would generally be treated
the same as the object offense, with only a modest downward adjustment.
Sixth: All base offense sentences would be subject to enhancement by the
court, if the offense involved a vulnerable victim, an official victim, or restraint of a victim.
Seventh: All base offense sentences would be subject to an upward or
downward adjustment by the court, depending upon the offender's role in the
offense.
Eighth: The total offense sentence level would be eligible for a downward
adjustment, if the court deemed the offender to have demonstrated acceptance
of responsibility for the offense. Defendants who plead guilty would not, per
se, be entitled to this adjustment, nor would defendants adjudicated by trial
be precluded from receiving it. The adjustment would rest solely within the
court's discretion.
Ninth: An offender's criminal history score would dramatically affect an offender's ultimate sentence. The more severe the past sentencing record, the
more the past criminal record would exacerbate the sentence for the instant
offense.
Tenth: For nonviolent or otherwise non-serious offenses, the court would
have the discretion to opt for a non-incarceration sentence, or, in the more
serious of these cases, for a sentence that substitutes community or intermittent confinement for some or all of the prescribed incarceration time.
Agreement to these ten premises, coupled with a commitment to write
guidelines in an iterative process over a period of years, aimed at reducing
disparity, increasing certainty, honesty and uniformity, and extending the use
of short shock incarceration for economic and other crimes, formed the core
of the rationale that governed the United States Sentencing Commission's
drafting policy.
it was further agreed that, consistent with the legislative history of patently
rejecting amendments proposed to format sentencing guidelines as a tool to
manage prison capacity, the Commission would consider the impact of its
guidelines on prison capacity, but it would not determine what would be an
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appropriate sentence on this basis.' 3 Moreover, it would neither subscribe nor
agree to an a priori assumption, as advocated by many just deserts proponents, that less, rather than more, punishment is appropriate. 14 Finally, it was
agreed that the overriding goal would be to issue sentencing guidelines that
would provide justice for the victim, for society, and for the defendant, guidelines which, hopefully, would contribute to a more effective and fair system of
criminal justice for all.
Contrary to the characterization by some, often repeated in the press, that
the new federal Sentencing Guidelines eliminate judicial discretion, substituting
in its place a mechanistic computer program where judges have no role, the
Guidelines, in fact, strike a balance between the prior system of unfettered
discretion, on the one hand, and rigid presumptive sentences tied to the offense of conviction without regard to variation in the offense or the offender's
criminal history, on the other. To be sure, judicial discretion in federal sentencing has been curtailed greatly, but we believe that it has been done so on
the basis of logic and rationality, pursuant to the statutory purposes as specified, clearly by Congress.
Unbounded judicial discretion, however theoretically laudable a goal, however great its potential for justice, did not, in fact, produce a system of sentences of which this nation could be proud, in which our citizenry could take
comfort, or to which our public could look for protection from criminal predation. It was not only equality among and between defendants that Congress
was seeking, but equity within the society. The former focusing on the rights
of defendants, the latter on the rights of victims, society, and defendants
taken together.
Thank you very much.
13. In its discussion of the provisions that would be codified at 28 U.S.C § 994(a), the Senate
Report states that "[t]he purpose of [requiring the Commission to take into account the nature
and capacity of the penal, correctional, and other facilities and services available] is to assure the
most appropriate use of the facilities and services to carry out the purposes of sentencing, and to
assure that the available capacity of the facilities and services is kept in mind when the guidelines
are promulgated. It is not intended, however, to limit the Sentencing Commission in recommending guidelines that it believes will best serve the purposes of sentencing." S. REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 175 (1983) (emphasis added). See also id. at 424 (discussing consideration and
rejection, by vote of 15-1, of Mathias amendment to direct the Commission to insure that the
guidelines would not be likely to result in an increase in aggregate terms of imprisonment, or in
the federal prison population).
14. See, e.g., VON HIRSCH, DoING JUSTICE: Tm CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION 136 (1976).

